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GOVERNMENT SEIZURES IN LABOR DISPUTES
BERTRAM F. WILLCOX AND ELIZABETH STOREY LANDIS*
Work stoppages caused by labor disputes in public utilities or other
industries vitally affecting the public health or safety have recently
become a matter of widespread agitation.' The response to the prob-
*The authors wish to express their gratitude to Eugene C. Gerhart, Esq., of Binghamton,
New York, for his help and suggestions throughout the entire article, and to Professor
John W. MacDonald of the Cornell Law School for reading the section dealing with
eminent domain and for suggesting the use of receivership techniques.
'Since the beginning of the Second World War, twelve states have passed statutes
dealing with some phase of the problem: FLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1947) §§ 453.01-453.17,
2A CCH LAB. LAW SERv. U 43,402 (1947); IND. ANeN. STAT. (Burns, Supp. 1947) §§ 40-
2401-40-2415, 2A CCH LAB. LAW SERV. U 43,409 (1947); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Supp. 1947),
c. 150B, §§ 1-7, 3 P-H LAB. LAW SERV. Uf 47,788 (1947); MnqN. STAT. ANN. (Supp.
1947) § 179.38, 2A CCH LAB. LAW SERv. ff 43,404A (1947); Mo. REV. STAT. (Supp.
1947) §§ 10178.101-10178.122, 3 P-H LAB. LAW SERV. 9 47,740 (1947); Neb. Laws 1947,
L. B. 537, 2A CCH LAB. LAW SERv. ff 43,402 (1947); N. J. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1947) §§
13 B:1-26, 2A CCH LAB. LAW SERV. Uf 42,514 (1947) ; N. D. REv. CODE (1943) tit. 37. §
37-0106; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1947) tit. 43, §§ 206, 213, 215, 2A CCH LAB. LAW
SERV. U 42,501-18; TEx. STAT., REV. Civ. (Vernon, 1947) art. 5154b, 2A CCH LAB. LAW
SERv. ff 43,412 (1947); VA. CODE (Michie, et al., Supp. 1948) § 1887 (113-40), 2A
CCH LAB. LAW SERv. Uf 43,406 (1947); Wis. STAT. (Brossard, Supp. 1947) § 111.50-111.65,
2A CCH LAB. LAW SERV. Uf 42,502-17 (1947); and see the emergency Virginia statute
dealing with ferries only, VA. CODE (Michie, et al., Supp. 1948) § 2072 (33).
In addition, the Kansas statute of World War I vintage, KAN. GEN. STAT. (Corrick,
1935) § 44-603, which declared the food, clothing, fuel industries and transportation of
them, as well as public utilities, to be "affected with public interest and subject to state
supervision," has been supplemented by a provision for emergency action in case of
work stoppage. KAN. GEN. STAT. (Corrick, Supp. 1947) § 44-620, 2A CCH LAB. LAw
SERV. F 43,402 (1947).
The intense feeling aroused by the problem is indicated by the statements of public
policy prefacing these statutes. For example, the Nebraska statute reads: "The con-
tinuous, uninterrupted, and proper operation of public utilities is essential to the welfare,
health and safety of the citizens of the state. It is contrary to the public policy of the
state to permit any substantial impairment or suspension of the operation of any public
utility by reason of industrial disputes therein and the state will exercise every power
at its command to prevent the same so as to protect its citizens from any dangers or
catastrophes which would result therefrom. The services of such public utilities are
clothed with a vital public interest and to protect same it is necessary that the relations
between the employers and employees in such industries be regulated by the state to
the extent and in the manner herein provided.
"No right exists in any natural or corporate person or group of persons to hinder, delay
or suspend the continuity or efficiency of any public -utility service, either by strike,
lockout, or any other means."
The Texas statute reads: ". . . continuous service by public utilities furnishing electric
energy, natural or artificial gas, or water to the public is absolutely essential to the life,
health and safety of all the people, and ...the wilful interruption or stoppage of such
services by any person or group of persons is a public calamity which cannot be endured. .."
See also Gerhart, Strikes and Eminent Domain, 30 J. A.. JuD. Soc'y 116 (1946);
TWENTiETir CENTURY FuND LABOR COMNIiTTEE, STRIKES AND D mocRATic GOVFEZR-MSNT
24-29 (1947); REPORT or THE GovE oR's LABOR-MANAGEMENT CoirsnE, Mass. H. R.
Doc. No. 1875 (Mar. 1947); Slichter, To End Strikes in Essential Inditstries, N. Y. Times.
Jan. 12, 1947, § 6, p. 7; SLIcHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRTAL RELATIONS 167-69 (1947).
Where the government failed to act in the case of the virtual lockout on the Toledo,
Peoria and Western Railroad, the initiative was taken by private interests representing
the affected community. In an action for equitable relief, the District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois held that the court might appoint a receiver to run the
railroad in the interests of the general public. Farmers Grain Co. v. Toledo, Peoria
& Western R. R., 66 F. Supp. 845 (S. D. Ill. 1946). The circuit court reversed, but
allowed a mandatory injunction to issue in behalf of petitioners requiring the railroad
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lem, however, has at best been sporadic and usually quite limited in its
scope. While nearly all the states have legislation providing for public
conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration services, only one-
quarter of them provide by statute for some further relief where these
measures fail;2 and in only four cases does the legislation affect work
stoppages in industries not covered by the term "public utilities."' The
Federal Government itself has provided, under the Taft-Hartley Act,4
for no more than a temporary stay through injunctive relief. Six states,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota and
Virginia, have statutes providing for seizures.
Unfortunately, any realistic program dealing with labor disputes
must anticipate the problem where collective bargaining, even imple-
mented by voluntary government services, may fail to prevent a strike
or lockout, and where the public interest necessitates uninterrupted
maintenance of the service or supply affected.5 In such a situation
to maintain its service. 158 F. 2d 109 (C. C. A. 7th 1946). The court further decreed,
Major, J., dissenting on this point, that the railroad was entitled to an injunction against
interference by strikers, despite the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.2This is apart from general provisions dealing with riot, disturbing the peace, etc.,
such as N. Y. Mil. Law §§ 8, 115. Many of the states' provide for fact-finding boards,
with publication of the findings where disputants refuse to accept the board's proposed
settlement. See, e.g., ME. Rav. STAT. (1944) c. 25, § 12 which provides that the board's
findings shall be published immediately.
However, where publicity fails, statutory remedies usually are lacking.31n general, the statutes include water, light, heat, gas, electric power, and public
passenger transportation or communication as within the term "public utilities" or
"essential industries." Massachusetts adds food and fuel to the list, and North Dakota
includes coal mines. Kansas in one sweeping paragraph includes: "(1) The manufacture
or preparation of food products . . . in any stage of the process . . .; (2) The manufacture
of clothing and . . . wearing apparel in common use . . .; (3) The mining or production
of any substance or material in common use as fuel . . .; (4) The transportation of
. . . [the above] . . . from the place where produced to the place of manufacture or
consumption; (5) All public utilities. . . ." Minnesota, on the other hand, limits the
provisions of its law to public charitable hospitals.
While the essential character of public utility services is indisputable, it is equally
clear that in modern urban society many other industries, including the producers and
distributors of certain consumers' goods, may be equally necessary to public health and
safety. This has been dramatically illustrated by the coal strike of late 1946. And see
Teller, Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 1017, 1056-57 (1947).
Where Minnesota recognized the need for uninterrupted hospital service by statute,
New York and Pennsylvania have in effect achieved the same result by court decisions
which acknowledge what Justice Pecora termed the "frantic immediacy" of hospital
emergency cases when he held that, "The necessity of avoiding . . . tragic consequences
to the public clearly outweighs the sound general policy favoring the protection of labor's
right to strike. . . ." New York Hospital v. Hanson, 185 Misc. 937, 943, 59 N. Y. S. 2d
91, 96 (Sup. Ct. 1945). See New York Hospital v. Hanson, 185 Misc. 934, 60 N. Y. S.
2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (preliminary hearing); Beth-El Hospital v. Robbins, 186 Misc.
506, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Western Pennsylvania Hospital v. Lichliter,
340 Pa. 382, 17 A. 2d 206 (1941). But see Northwestern Hospital of Minneapolis v.
Public Building Service Employees' Union Local No. 113, 208 Minn. 389, 294 N. W.
215 (1940).
461 STAT. 155-56 (1947), 29 U. S. C. §§ 179-80 (Supp. 1947).5Even the much vaunted Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45
U. S. C. § 151 (1946), with the famous provision for a "cooling-off period," could not
prevent a strike which ultimately necessitated government seizure during the war, nor
again in the spring of 1948.
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there appears to be no alternative to government compulsion in some
form,6  whether it be by injunction,7  compulsory arbitration,' gov-
ernment seizure, 9 or nationalization.' 0 It is the writers' belief that of
the methods listed above, temporary government seizure until agree-
ment can be reached by private negotiation is the most feasible and
the least antipathetic to the preservation of free enterprise and free
OGerhart, Labor Disputes-Their Settlement by Judicial Process, 32 A. B. A. J. 752,
803 (1946) lists nine methods of settling labor disputes in order of increasing legal com-
pulsion, from conference between the parties, to making striking treason.
lThe states may have to amend their "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts" in order to give
their courts jurisdiction to enjoin strikers in private industries, although the New York
and Pennsylvania cases cited in note 3 supra indicate at least some authority to the con-
trary. This point was squarely raised in the case of the Duquesne Power and Light
Co., Ct. of Common Pleas, Allegheny Co., Pa., No. 2978, Oct. Term, 1946. The City
of Pittsburgh, in the name of its director of public health, obtained an injunction re-
quiring (1) the employees to refrain from striking, and (2) the company to assemble
its out-of-state directors to meet to negotiate with the union. The city's bill emphasized
that it was seeking relief as the sovereign, and not as an antagonist, and was supported
by affidavits made by the president and the secretary of the Allegheny County Medical
Society, the secretary of the Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania, the Director of
the Department of Public Works in Pittsburgh, and the Director of Public Safety in the
city. The union president was temporarily jailed for contempt of court for failure to
obey the injunction. However, the case was never appealed, as the city and the union
reached a compromise, and the bill was dismissed at the request of the city.
The use of injunctions against striking employees raises serious questions of policy as well
as of law. First, there is the historic antagonism of labor against "government by
injunction" coupled with the fear that they may be used by unsympathetic public
officials as freely as by private employers. Secondly, the use of injunctions unduly favors
the party that is attempting to maintain the status quo. He may continue his course of
action without attempting to meet demands upon him, secure in the knowledge that
the injunction prevents his opponents from using their most effective method of ex-
erting pressure for change. The new Texas statute contains an example of exactly the
type of provision that is feared by labor. Section 3 of the act makes it unlawful to
picket the premises of any public utility to disrupt services or to intimidate employees
to that end, and the court is empowered to issue a restraining order to prevent such
action. But the Act does not deal with the problem of lock-outs at all.8 The Florida, Indiana, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin statutes make this the
keystone of handling labor disputes in public utilities. The Nebraska statute empowers
the State Court of Industrial Relations to perform the same function under a different
name, and the New Jersey statute provides for compulsory arbitration to settle the issue
after seizure.
Compulsory arbitration is, however, condemned generally by students of labor relations,
labor, and management as destroying the concept of free collective bargaining. TWENTmTH
CENTURY FUND LABOR COMMITTEE, STRIKES AND DuarocRATic GOVERNMENT 15 (1947);
Hearing before the Sen. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on the Taft-Hartley
Bill, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2, p. 590 (1947) (statement by Ira Mosher, chairman of
the Executive Committee of the National Association of Manufacturers on Compulsory
Arbitration); id. Part 3, pp. 1207-10 (statement by Joseph A. Beirne, president of the
National Federation of Telephone Workers); id. Part 3, p. 1531 (brief submitted by
Walter P. Reuther, President of the United Automobile Workers, CIO). But see Huebner,
Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 30 J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 123 (1946).0 Seizure was, of course, the method used by the Government under the War Labor
Disputes Act, 57 STAT. 163 (1943), 50 U. S. C. § 1501 (1946), and has been suggested as a
necessary measure in many studies dealing with the problem of work stoppages in es-
sential industries. Gerhart, Strikes and Eminent Domain, 30 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 116 (1946) ;
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND LABOR COAfImITTEE, STRIKES AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNM2aENT
24-29 (1947); Slichter, To End Strikes in Essential Industries, N. Y. Times, Jan. 12,
1947, § 6, p. *7; SiCaHTER, THE CHALLENGE OP INDuSTRIAL RELATiONS 167-69 (1947);
REPORT OF THE GOvERNOR's LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, Mass. H. R. Doc. No.
1875 (Mar. 1947).
1OFor example, the topic of the Labor Relations Forum Broadcast for Wednesday
night, Dec. 4, 1946, was: "Should We Nationalize the Coal Mines?"
1948]
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labor. 1 However, this paper does not attempt to recite the arguments
supporting this policy, 2 nor to marshal the law upholding the right of
the government to seize and operate essential industries. 3 It is written
to suggest some of the problems that may arise where seizure is adopted
as the means of coping with work stoppages in necessary industries. 4
"lSeizure is "a step short of government ownership, taken in a free-enterprise society
in cases of extraordinary emergency." Teller, Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 60
HARV. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1947). It "appears at present to be a means of reconciling
democratic institutions with the adequate handling of crisis situations." Id. at 1059. It
is the only one of the four methods which allows free collective bargaining to continue
without unduly favoring one of the parties, as in the case of injunction. See notes 7-10
supra and the statement of Donald R. Richberg during the 1948 railroad strike, N. Y.
Times, May 16, 1948, § 4, p. 7, col. 6.
12 For a thoroughgoing condemnation, see the Newsletter of the Federation of the Bar,
Sixth Judicial District, containing a report on the March 21, 1947 meeting of the Federa-
tion Committee on Labor Law: "The Committee felt that the elements of the plan had
been tried by the Federal Government under the Wartime Acts and that they should not
be further perpetuated as their inadequacy had been proven and their totalitarian in-
cidents would be destructive to individual liberty and opportunity ....
"'In our anxiety to resolve our labor difficulties, we should be careful not to subvert
our free institutions.
"'The peacetime seizure of private industry by government; the concept of a man's
job as property which may be appropriated by government; the peacetime suspension
of the right to strike in what is essentially private industry; the compulsory fixing of wages
and investment returns by government boards in peacetime-these are concepts which
are foreign to our free enterprise system. If adopted in respect to our key industries,
it is difficult to see how complete regimentation of our economy could be avoided-
with all that means in the destruction of individual liberty and opportunity ...
"'If, when set free, individual freedom and responsibility prove inadequate to the
task, there will be time for the more drastic forms of government intervention, but we
believe that in such event, we, as lawyers, should make it clear that it is not consti-
tutional democracy, but something quite foreign to it, that has been called into play. ... '
The writers believe that these excerpts from the committee's report show a serious
misunderstanding of the suggestion of government seizure. In the first place, such pro-
cedure is designed for emergencies only, in the situation where a work stoppage is brought
about by the failure of employees and employer to reach a working agreement and
where the result would seriously affect the necessary community services. Is it "foreign,"
for example, to use compulsion to assure coal for homes or hospitals in below-zero weather,
or to make sure there is water to fight fires, as well as for essential sanitary purposes?
Secondly, the concept of what is "essentially private industry" seems somewhat doubtful
when used in respect to public utilities, which are subject to relatively rigorous govern-
ment regulation because of their importance to the welfare of the whole community.
Third, the attributes of government seizure as stated by the committee seem to be
exaggerated. For example, "compulsory fixing of wages and investment returns" sounds
more like a reference to compulsory arbitration than to seizure, under which labor and
management may continue to bargain as to the terms of employment to which they can
mutually agree.13 For a thorough exposition of this point, see Gerhart, Strikes and Eminent Domain,
30 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 116 (1946). He argues that the government may take an interest
less than legal title by eminent domain for a period limited by the duration of the public
use. SECOND WAR POWERs ACT, 56 STAT. 176 (1942), 50 U. S. C. § 631 et seq. (1946), in
§ 632 provided for the acquisition of real property, "temporary use thereof, or other
interest therein, together with any personal property located thereon or used therewith,"
by condemnation.
The constitutionality of the New Jersey seizure and compulsory arbitration provisions
has been upheld against attack by both employer and employees in Van Riper v. Traffic
Telephone Workers Federation of New Jersey, - N. J. Eq. -, 61 A. 2d 570 (Ch. 1948).
14pla-nt seizure was a problem of the Federal Government during the war when the
object was to maintain war production. At the present time it is more likely to be a
state question. In general, however, the same problems will arise, whether the state
or federal government acts, and the same considerations will apply. Except where other-
wise stated, in the section dealing with future seizures, no distinctions will be made
between federal and state governments.
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The fact that the situation may be expected to occur only infrequently,
and that any form of government intervention will be unpopular at
best, does not lessen the need to anticipate questions that will arise
upon those rare but crucial occasions. Each such occasion will be an
emergency, with pressures and passions running high. Careful study
and wise planning can be better carried forward ahead of the storm,
in a quieter atmosphere. If such preparation should result in legis-
lation, furthermore, advance knowledge of the full effects of such
government intervention may induce the disputants to reach a satis-
factory agreement by negotiation.
Wartime Seizures'5
The Federal Government's wartime policy appears to offer relatively
little assistance in formulating principles under which to operate in
peacetime. During the war, seizure appears usually to have been
little more than a formal gesture, sufficient only to bluff or cajole, in
the name of the United States, employees and employers into continuing
production despite their differences. 16
The standard form of executive order empowering a federal official
-usually the War or Navy Secretaryl'--to seize and operate a war
plant contained seemingly broad powers, phrased in the following
manner:
"[the specified official] . .. is authorized and directed, through
and with the aid of any persons or instrumentalities that he may
designate, to take possession of the plants and facilities of-
located at -, and, to the extent that he may deem necessary, of
any real or personal property, and other assets wherever situated,
used in connection with the operations thereof; to operate or to
arrange for the operation of the plants and facilities in any manner
that he deems necessary for the successful prosecution of the war;
to exercise any contractual or other rights . . .and to continue the
employment of, or to employ, any persons, and to do any other
thing, that he may deem necessary for, or incidental to, the opera-
tion of the said plants and facilities and the production, sale and
distributioh of the products thereof; and to take any other steps
15 Included in this section are seizures after "V-J" day, but before the expiration of
the President's powers under the War Labor Disputes Act.
16"With the exception of the anthracite coal miners in 1945, the strikers during the
war always did go back to work under government seizure. They were under no legal
compulsion to do so, however, and many times it was doubtful up to the last minute
whether even seizure would be effective." Witte, Wartime Handling of Labor Disputes,
25 HARV. Bus. REV. 169, 172 (1947).1 7Major exceptions: the Secretary of the Interior seized the coal mines; the Secretary
of Commerce (with physical assistance from the Army) took over Montgomery Ward;
the Secretary of Agriculture took over the meat processing plants; and the Director of
the Office of Defense Transportation seized the railroads and other transportation system,
including buses, trucking systems, Great Lakes boats, and New York Harbor facilities.
1948]
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that he deems necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes
of this order. . ."" (italics added.)
But in most cases these powers were then restricted by a paragraph
which directed the Secretary to "permit the management of the plants
and facilities taken under the provisions of this order to continue with
its managerial functions to the maximum degree possible, consistent
with the aims of this order." 9
While presidential orders varied according to the circumstances and
subject matter of the case involved,"0 a certain pattern of rights and
liabilities of employees, employers, and government appears to be quite
clear and consistent throughout the entire war period. The major re-
curring factors are listed below:"
Employees' rights
1. In general, the employees were protected in the exercise of their
rights to continue membership in .labor organizations, to bargain col-
lectively, through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in "concerted activity" for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, so long as these activities did not inter-
fere with war production; they retained all rights under the National
Labor Relations Act. 2
2. Employees retained rights to all statutory benefits available
under private operation, such as social security, workmen's compensation,
etc.- Where workmen's compensation was not in effect, employees
1 I8 talics added. This example is quoted from Exec. Order No. 9477, 9 FED. REG. 10,941
(1944) (Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co.).
191bid. Naturally such a provision did not occur when seizure was caused by company
non-compliance with War Labor Board orders.2 0The orders differed, of course, depending on whether non-compliance of labor or of
management had caused the seizure. The greatest variations and the most specific detail
were embodied in the orders seizing the coal mines, the railroads, Montgomery Ward Co.,
and certain other "problem" industries.
2 1This paper is limited to incidents of government seizure during and after the war
only. As to the long government experience in operation of the railroads during World
War I, pursuant to the seizure provision of the army appropriation bill of 1916, the
Federal Control Act of March 21, 1918, and the Transportation Act of 1920 (termination),
see Tomlinson, Federal Wartime Control, 51 C. J. 448-59 (1930) ; and particularly,
North Carolina R. R. v. Lee, 260 U. S. 16, 43 Sup. Ct. 2 (1922); Missouri Pac. R. R. v.
Ault, 256 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. Ct. 593 (1921); Kansas City So. Ry. v. Comm'r, 52 F. 2d 372
(C. C. A. 8th 1931).22 E.g., Exec. Order No. 9340, 8 FED. REG. 5695 (1943) (coal mines); Exec. Order No.
9727, 11 FED. REG. 5461 (1946) (railroads); Glen Alden Coal Co. v. NLRB, 141 F. 2d 47
(C. C. A. 3d 1944); Ken-Rad Tube & Lamp Corp., 56 N. L. R. B. 1050 (1944); West
Kentucky Coal Co., 54 N. L. R. B. 358 (1944); Pschirrer & Sons Coal Co., 50 N. L. R. B.
530 (1943).2 3E.g., Solid Fuels Admin. Reg., Operation of Mines under Govt. Control, § 603.23, 8
FED. REG. 6655 (1943); Federal Mgr. of Motor Carrier Transportation, ODT Order, 9
FED. REG. 10,102 (1944).
GOVERNMENT SEIZURES
retained their common law right to bring an action against the private
operator for negligent injury occurring during the seizure period."4
3. Employees might apply to the War Labor Board for changes in
wages and working conditions, and the Board's order was binding upon
the government agency in charge of seizure.2 5 And where seizure was
caused by company non-compliance with Board orders, such as failure
to agree to a maintenance-of-membership clause in the contract, the
government manager put such orders into effect. 6
Employees' liabilities, and limitations on their rights
1. Wages and conditions of employment in effect at the outset were
continued during seizure subject, of course, to the provision for change
by application to the War Labor Board."
2. Rights to engage in "concerted activity" were limited to activity
that did not hinder the war effort.2 Strikes and slowdowns were
absolutely prohibited, although the right to quit work individually was
assured.2 To enforce this prohibition, the government had available:
injunctive relief; 30 criminal sanctions;31 and administrative remedies, 2
including action by local selective service boards, 3 although apparently
this last was not often employed.
24Stanton v. Ruthbel Coal Co., 127 W. Va. 685, 34 S. E. 2d 257 (1945), cert. denied,
326 U. S. 740, 66 Sup. Ct. 53 (1945).
251VAR LABOR DispuTEs AcTs § 5, 57 STAT. 163 (1943), 50 U. S. C. § 1505 (1946). The
Act will hereafter be referred to as WLDA.2 6E.g., Exec. Order No. 9484, 9 FED. REG. 11,731 (1944) ordered the Secretary of War
upon seizing the Farrell Cheek Steel Co. to observe the terms and conditions of the
directive order of the regional War Labor -Board, with which the company had not complied.
27WLDA § 4.28R.g., Exec. Order No. 9340, 8 FED. REO. 5695 (1943).
29WLDA § 6.
30United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 67 Sup. Ct. 677 (1947).
-q'WLDA § 6. This section also applied to plants seized not under the authority of the
War Labor Disputes Act. United States v. McMenamin, 58 F. Supp. 478 (E. D. Pa.
1944).821n re California Metal Trades Association, 14 LAB. REL. REP. M~w. 1681 (WLB
Decision, Aug. 19, 1944) (on Navy's petition, War Labor Board canceled certain privi-
leges union had enjoyed under expired contract); Exec. Order No. 9585, 10 FED. REG.
8335 (1945) (Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.) (upon request F. B. I. to investigate "any
matter affecting the operation of said plants. . . ."). See San Francisco Lodge No. 68 v.
Forrestal, 58 F. Supp. 466 (N. D. Cal. 1944) (where the Secretary of the Navy threatened
to withhold clearances and referrals, through the War Manpower Commission, from any
union member discharged for infractions of the rules and regulations, if the court were
to rule on the petition for injunction as stating a cause of action, it would hold that
denial of clearance was not a penalty, and therefore not beyond the power of the
Secretary, but was remedial); I. A. M. Lodge 68, Office of Director of Economic
Stabilization Order, 9 FED. REO. 10,214 (1944) (denying supplemental gasoline ration
coupons because employees refused to work overtime).83E.g., Exec. Order No. 9408, 8 FED. REG. 16,958 (1943) (Secretary of War authorized
to request the War Labor Board to withhold or withdraw from Employees Association
of the Western Electric Co. Breeze Point plants, all benefits, privileges, and rights ac-
cruing to the Association under terms of employment in effect until Association de-
monstrates willingness to comply with War Labor Board order, and to recommend to
the authorized federal agencies the entry of appropriate orders relating to modification
or cancellation of draft deferments or unemployment privileges, or both); Exec. Order
1948]
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3. Civil service status and protection were not granted to any
employees.3 4
Employers' rights35
1. Executive orders commonly provided that the managements of
the seized plants were to be permitted to "continue their respective
managerial functions to the maximum degree possible, consistent with
the purposes of this order."3 6
2. In general, terms and conditions of employment in effect at the
outset were continued. 37
3. Existing contracts and agreements remained in full effect. 8
4. The seizing agency was directed to protect the plant property,
employees returning to work and persons seeking employment.3 9
5. Executive orders sometimes provided that no attachment by
mesne process, garnishment, execution or otherwise should be levied
against any property of the seized company without prior approval of
the government agency involved.4"
Employers' liabilities
1. Employers were subject to: all provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act; 4 all existing employee benefit programs such as social
security; 42 and common law liability for negligent injury during seizure,
where employees were not covered by workmen's compensation.'
No. 9496, 9 FED. REG. 13,187 (1944) (certain companies near Toledo, Ohio; "All federal
agencies, including . . . the National Selective Service System, and the Department
of Justice, are directed to cooperate with the Secretary . . . in carrying out the purposes
of this order. ").3 4 Solid Fuels Admin. Reg., Operation of Mines under Govt. Control § 603.23 (e) 8
FED. REG. 6655 (1943); Fed. Mgr. of Govt. Controlled Railroads, ODT Order, 11 FED.
REG. 5512 (1946).3 5Throughout this paper "employers," "owners," and "management" are used to mean
an identical interest. It is recognized that in actual fact there will often be a conflict
between these groups, and that the owners may be penalized for the labor policy of a
management over which in reality they have very little control. However, ownership
cannot with justice be allowed to shift this penalty to the public generally or to labor;
that problem must be resolved within the framework of internal corporation adminis-
tration. For a possible remedy available to stockholders, see Abrams v. Allen, 297 N. Y.
52, 74 N. E. 2d 305 (1947).
36 Except, of course, where seizure was caused by company non-compliance with War
Labor Board orders. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9395B, 8 Fan. REaG. 16,957 (1943) (leather
manufacturing plants near Salem, Peabody and Danvers, Mass.); Exec. Order No. 9463,
9 FE. RaG. 9879 (1944) (various tool works located in San Francisco, Cal.).37WLDA § 4.3 8 E.g., Exec. Order No. 9727, 11 FED. REG. 5461 (1946) (railroads).39 E.g., Exec. Order No. 9426, 9 FEn. REG. 2113 (1944) (Department of Water and
Power of City of Los Angeles, Cal.); Exec. Order No. 9484, 9 FED. REG. 11,731 (1944)
(Farrell Cheek Steel Co.).4 E.g., Exec. Order No. 9570, 10 FaD. REG. 7235 (1945) (Scranton Transportation Co..
Scranton, Pa.); Exec. Order No. 9693, 11 FED. REG. 1421 (1946) (New York Harbor
facilities).4 1 See note 22 supra.4 2 See note 23 supra.4 3 See note 24 supra.
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2. Government orders to employers were enforced by: replacement
of private personnel who failed to cooperate when designated to act on
behalf of the seizing agency;44 ouster and denial of access to manage-
ment; 45 or receivership. 6
3. Private companies remained subject to all provisions of federal,
state and local statutes, ordinances and regulations, and were required
to meet all federal, state and local taxes in the usual manner."
Government rights
1. The Government could enforce its orders against employees and
employers by any of the methods noted above.4
2. It could apply all statutes, ordinances and regulations to the
seized companies and tax as usual.49
3. The seizing agency could seek changes in existing wages and
working conditions by application to the War Labor Board; 0 and
where the refusal of private owners to put Board directives into effect
had caused the seizure, executive orders empowered the agency to put
the directives into effect and to pay out of net operating income wage
increases accrued prior to taking possession.8
4. The Government's interest in plant property was protected by
criminal laws protecting the United States. 2
5. The United States could not be bound, nor liability imposed upon
it, by any plant executive in the absence of specific direction by the
seizing agency.53
Government responsibilities
1. All agencies were required to furnish persons and instrument-
alities to aid in attaining the objectives of the seizure-to obtain
44E.g., Solid Fuels Admin. Reg., Operation of Mines under Govt. Control § 603.15 (b)
8 FED. REG. 6655 (1943).45The famous case illustrating this point is, of course, the forcible removal of Sewell
Avery from his office in the Chicago Montgomery Ward headquarters. N. Y. Times,
April 27, 1944, p. 1, col. 8; April 28, p. 1, col. 1; April 29, p. 1, col. 2.46The Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad was in the hands of a government official
acting as a receiver during the greater part of the war, due to the continued and un-
compromising labor strife between the owners and the union. But see note 1 supra as
to the propriety of a receivership granted at the instance of affected private interests.47E.g., Exec. Order No. 9727, 11 FED. REG. 5461 (1946).48See notes 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 42, and 43 supra.4 9See note 47 supra.
5 0WLDA § 5.51E.g., Exec. Order No. 9480, 9 FED. REG. 11,143 (1944) (Twentieth Century Brass
Works, Inc.); Exec. Order No. 9508, 9 FED. REG. 15,079 (1944) (certain plants of
Montgomery Ward. Co..).
52E.g., Solid Fuels Admin. Reg., Operation of Mines under Govt. Control § 603.24
(c), 8 FED. REG. 6655 (1943).
53E.g., Coal Mines Admin. Reg., Operation of Mines under Govt. Control, 8 FED. REC.
10,712 (1943) (amending coal mine regulations).
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efficient war production; 4 and all agencies were required to aid in en-
forcement of seizure orders.55
2. The army or other designated agencies were required to furnish
protection to the seized property6 and to employees returning to work
or to persons seeking employment 5 7
3. Where private plant managers were unwilling to take the re-
sponsibility for carrying out any order of the federal manager, the
seizing agency took over the burden."'
The railroad seizure of 1948
When contract negotiations between the railroads and the railway
unions broke down in May, 1948, the president used an old pre-World
War I statute as authority for army seizure of he railroads. 9 The
statute provided that the president in time of war60
"is empowered to take possession and assume control of any . . .
systems of transportation . . .and to utilize the same .. .for the
transportation of troops, war material and equipment, or for such
other purposes connected with the emergency as may be needful
or desirable."6' (italics added).
Under this authority, intended primarily to enable the president to
transport troops or war supplies in case of need, the executive order,
issued May 10, 1948,62 ordered the Secretary of the Army to seize
the railroads.
The order might well have been one of those used in an earlier World
War II seizure, with only the names and dates changed; the pattern of
rights and duties of the parties was not changed; the Secretary was
ordered to take only such possession and control as was necessary for
operation of the nation's railway system. He was to permit the carriers
"to continue their respective management functions to the maximum
degree possible consistent with the purposes of this order." The rail-
roads were to continue in the ordinary course of business, and pay-
ments of dividends, interest, etc., were to be made as usual. The terms
54..g., Exec. Order No. 9141, 7 FED. R G. 2961 (1942) (Brewster Aeronautical Corp.);
Exec. Order No. 9496, 9 FED. REG. 13,187 (1944) (certain companies near Toledo, Ohio).
5 5Ibid.56E.g., Exec. Order No. 9554, 10 FED. REG. 5981 (1945) (motor carriers in and about
Chicago, Ill.).
571bid.58E.g., Federal Mgr. of Motor Carrier Transportation, ODT Order, 9 FED. REG. 10,102
(1944).
5939 STAT. 619, 645 (1916), 10 U. S. C. § 1361 (1946). This provision was stuck in
the middle of a long army appropriation bill.60 Since peace treaties had not yet been signed in May, 1948," the war still continued
technically despite an earlier termination of the "war emergency." See 22 LAB. REL. REF.
MAN. 30 (1948).
6139 STAT. 619, 645 (1916), 10 U. S. C. § 1361 (1946).62Exec. Order No. 9957, 13 FED. REG. 2503 (1948).
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and conditions of employment in effect at the beginning of the seizure
were to continue, and employees were to have all their accustomed
rights to engage in union activity, except the right to strike.63
In granting the Government's petition for an injunction at the time
of the seizure, Judge Goldsborough found that:
"Upon the assumption on May 10, 1948, of such possession,
control and operation of the carriers by the United States, the United
States became the employer of the employees performing services
on the seized carriers. Such employee relationship has continued
to the date of this hearing and at no time have the carriers them-
selves stood in the capacity of employers.1
64
Nevertheless, this formal seizure by the Government was highly ob-
jectionable to the railway employees since it seemed to leave them
exactly where they had been before but shorn of the right to strike to
enforce their demands, while the carriers continued in de facto control
and were apparently under no bargaining disadvantage. In a strongly
worded statement the Railway Labor Executives Association demanded
that the Government,
"having designated itself as the legal operator of the railroads,
assume the full responsibilities of operation; that the Government
take control of the revenues of the railroads as it has already taken
control of the employees of the railroads, and proceed to bargain
upon wages and working conditions."' '65
But in granting the permanent injunction, Judge Goldsborough glossed
over the carriers' continuing management. Such control, he said, was
granted only by express delegation of the Secretary of the Army; and
what power he had delegated, he might take away and grant to other
subordinates of his own choosing.66 In any case, the carriers in fact
continued to direct railroad operations until the properties were officially
returned.
In respect to future terms and conditions of employment, the Gov-
ernment took an unequivocal stand in favor of entirely private negoti-
ation without intervention by the Secretary of the Army. 7 Whether
this policy was based upon dislike of compulsory arbitration, fear of
the political inexpediency of intervention with elections close at hand,
or belief that this policy would improve the possibilities of permanent
63This is not an exhaustive list of provisions, but merely those illustrating the similarity
between this and previous seizure orders.
6 4United States v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 79 F. Supp. 485 (D. D. C.
1948), 22 LAB. REL. R ar. MAN. 2148 (1948).
6 5N. Y. Times, May 22, 1948, p. 1, col. 2.
6 6United States v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 79 F. Supp. 485 (D. D. C.
1948), 22 LAB. REL. RF. MAN. 2267 (1948).6 7N. Y. Times, June 12, 1948, p. 1, col. 1.
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peace,6" the Government maintained its position unmoved until the
unions and the railroads finally composed their differences.
The history of the railroad seizure seems to indicate that the Federal
Government had not prepared any plan to meet such emergency. The
authority for the seizure was weak; the order showed no advance from
wartime measures; and the admirable intent to let the parties work
out their own solution without formal intervention was vitiated by a
policy which deprived workers of their right to strike but allowed the
carriers to continue to garner profits. State and Federal Governments
should heed this experience and prepare in advance by carefully drawn
statutes for possible future emergencies. This is one case where having
a law "on the books" may serve a valuable purpose even if it is never
used.
Preparing for Future Seizures
Assuming the necessity of seizure in work stoppages affecting public
health and safety, the problems arising out of such government action,9
may be roughly classified into two general categories; those concerning
substantive policy considerations, and those involving day-to-day ad-
ministration of the seized facilities.
In the first category belong the problems of: (1) the degree of
control exercised by the government, and the method of exercising it;
(2) allocation of profits and losses during the period of government
operation; (3) compensation for seizure and operation by the govern-
ment; (4) change or maintenance of wages and working conditions
during seizure; (5) the right to strike or to quit during seizure; (6)
provisions for termination of control.
Problems in the second category include: (1) continuation of union
activity of the kind prohibited to regular government employees; (2)
continuation of private benefit systems, such as social security, etc.; (3)
effect of government seizure upon contracts made prior to or during
the period of government control; (4) tort liability; (5) application
of federal, state and local taxes and regulatory provisions; (6) suits
by or against the seized company; (7) bankruptcy, receivership and
reorganization proceedings.
6SThis argument was accepted by Judge Goldsborough in his decision of the application
for the permanent injunction, United States v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
79 F. Supp. 485 (D. D. C. 1948), 22 LAB. REL. RLa. MAx. 2267 (1948).
69This section relates only to actual seizure problems. A comprehensive statute might
cover such points as voluntary conciliation, mediation, and arbitration services, fact-finding
boards, "cooling-off" periods, etc.; provisions for seizure should be limited to last resort
when all other methods fail.
The Virginia statute prohibits strikes or lock-outs for a period of five weeks after
notice to the governor, during which time the state may train workers to replace
workers who intend to leave their jobs.
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Substantive Policy
1. Degree and method of control:
As noted above, during the war the control exercised by the Govern-
ment was in most cases nominal.7" In many cases the company presi-
dent or another of its executive officers was named government man-
ager, under the direction of the Secretary of War or Navy.1 The
United States flag, a few military officials present at the outset, and
a few placards, evidenced government control;72 and those combined
with patriotic appeal induced workers to return where a strike had
been called. 71 It is seriously questioned whether today the outward
symbols alone would induce a return to work. Disputant employees
might well feel that such an arrangement was a mere sham under which
the same employers would profit by the continuance of work under
the same old wages and working conditions. At the same time it is clear
that it may be impossible-certainly highly impracticable-to install
a complete hierarchy of government officials to take over and manage
a going concern, one which by hypothesis must not fail to render
continuous and efficient service to the community.
Thus the problem becomes one of a feasible compromise which will
satisfy employees that actual control is being exercised by the govern-
ment but which still will not place undue burdens upon the public
officials who administer the plan. The minimum requirement would
seem to be the nomination of a government manager, not connected
with either of the parties or with the government conciliation or arbitra-
tion services (which presumably have failed to prevent the impasse),
to replace the top private executive, and to take actual control. The
wartime policy of naming a plant executive as government manager
should not be followed. It is suggested that the government policy,
in regard to company profits, discussed immediately below, may have
a decided effect upon labor's attitude as to the genuineness of the con-
trol exercised by the government.
70Teller, Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 60 HARV. L. RaV. 1017, 1040 (1947).
Exceptional cases occurred when seizure was caused by company non-compliance.
Among the most notorious cases are those involving Montgomery Ward & Co., S. A.
Woods Co., and the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad.
71 E.g., Solid Fuels Admin. Reg., Operation of Mines under Govt. Control § 603.15
(a), 8 FED. REc. 6655 (1943) provides that operation of the coal mines is ordinarily to
be entrusted to a company officer formerly in charge of operations, who is authorized to
act for the company, and who will act as Operating Manager for the United States
while continuing to serve as officer or employee of the company.
72 See Office of the Secretary of the Interior Orders, 10 FED. REG. 3983-84 (1945)
(relating to seizure of the coal mines); Witte, Wartime Handling of Labor Disputes, 25
HAkv. Bus. REv. 169, 175 (1947).
73 Witte, Wartime Handling of Labor Disputes, 25 HARv. Bus. Rv. 169, 172 (1947).
Note that the problem was somewhat different where the moving cause of seizure was
company failure to obey a WLB directive, since seizure ended effective company re-
sistance.
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In general, the industries liable to seizure are public utilities, which
are monopolies.74 They should not, therefore, have grounds for serious
complaint about government control as it would affect their future
competitive position. 75 However, cases might arise where the seized
company, such as a fuel processor or distributor, might be adversely
affected as to future competitive ability by some policy adopted by
government siezure officials, as for example, a decision affecting the
price to be charged on long-term contracts, or effecting an expansion of
marketing facilities. Even a utility, for that matter, might suffer from
an expansionist policy. (The special problems involving wages and
working conditions are discussed below under 4.) It is submitted that
this nevertheless is not a sufficient ground for any differentiation in the
degree of control exercised. Any competitive industry in which a
strike occurs may suffer injury to its future competitive position from
a strike; this is one of the factors upon which a union relies in seeking
to obtain its demands. Where government seizure prevents the strike,
there is no particular reason for eliminating the substituted pressure
of possible detriment caused by a variation between a government
management policy and the policy which the company would prefer, 0
provided the government manager acts in good faith.77
To require no more than good faith, might seem naive to many,
including those engaged in business management, who react allergically
to "government bureaucracy" and all its works. Men who spend their
days in setting policies for large corporations naturally distrust the
ability of a government administrator, however well intentioned, to
make those delicate decisions. It is the same feeling which comes out
in objection to arbitration of any issue which might trench on man-
agement functions (or "management prerogatives," to use the bargain-
74Exceptions would include essential industries not recognized as utilities, such as coal
mines.7 5The rare exception would be the case of utilities whose products are competitive,
such as, to a limited extent and in limited areas, gas and electricity.
76It is doubtful if this danger is more than speculative, since the government manager
would probably consult company officers on any long-term policy. If, as is advocated
below, wages and working conditions existing at the time of seizure are continued until
a change is agreed upon by the parties, the possibility of the government manager in-
augurating a wage change that would make it impossible'-for the company to complete
is eliminated.
In the provisions for seizure of the motor carriers, the carriers were allowed to make
formal protest to the Federal Manager regarding any action required of them for which
they were unwilling to take responsibility; the rule was thereupon suspended as to the
protesting carrier until such time as the Federal Manager specifically directed that it be
put into effect. Federal Mgr. of Motor Carrier Transportation, ODT Order, 9 FED. R G.
10,102 (944).
7 7Where he acts in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority the government
manager should be personallv liable and the company should be able to obtain court
relief against him personally, FRmiND, AnmmsTmATm PowERs OVER PERsoNs AND PROPER-
TY 253-54 (1928).
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ing-table phrase) and which no arbitrator, no "outsider" however fair,
can possibly know enough to handle wisely. To some extent these
views are probably exaggerated, by the current way of thinking by
business about government. (To say this is not to say that the ex-
aggerations may be disregarded safely; they form a very real part of
the conditions given, in which our problems must be solved.) To some
extent the views are probably sound; they form a part of one of the
most pressing questions of our era: to what extent can socialized busi-
ness compensate for a probably lesser efficiency by a probably greater
service of the general good? The difficulty would be enhanced here,
furthermore, by the temporary nature of a government administrator,
which would make it especially difficult for him to make wise decisions
on policy.
Perhaps the dangers might be lessened by limiting the adminis-
trator's authority to those decisions reasonably necessary to the current
operation of the plant during the probable period of seizure. Whether
such a limitation would present a soluble problem in draftmanship, or
an impossible one, is hard to guess in advance of study and trial in
connection with a particular type of utility or other essential industry.
'We do not intend to belittle the difficulties. In broad perspective,
however, they seem less formidable, for a business which must go
on in the public interest, but which cannot agree with its workers on
how to do so, than do the difficulties of compulsory arbitration or
the difficulties of nationalization.
Enforcement of government policy against employees is discussed
below under 5. Enforcement against company officials should be ef-
fected by summary dismissal of officers7 who fail to follow directions
or who willfully obstruct the program of the government manager.
In the manager's discretion, they should thereafter be refused access
to the company's property for part of the period of seizure, or the
whole of it; and they should not be entitled to salary during the period
of ouster.
Here again there are difficulties which' ought not to be blinked.
If management should refuse to follow the orders of the administrator,
or if a large part of management should so refuse, the plant would
have to shut down. This is as certainly true as the correlative fact,
much more generally recognized, that if workers should refuse to return to
their work, or to continue work, in spite of a govenment seizure,
operations would have to cease. Unless and until all our freedoms go
7 8This term should include all supervisory officials whose interests in the dispute are
clearly connected with those of the management. Whether foremen and persons of
similar status are included in this class will depend upon the facts of the particular case.
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down under a machine-gunning State, these conclusions are unavoidable.
The practical answer, which has served us fairly well thus far, is
that the sense of responsibilty to the public and its government, the
pressures of public opinion and the fear of public indignation, com-
bine to keep both management and labor pretty well at work under
a governmental operation.
2. Allocation of profits and losses:
According to Witte, during the war, plant owners retained whatever
profits were earned during tlhe seizure, while the Government bore the
loss, if any.79 With a few exceptions, executive orders did not deal
specifically with this point, but the general approach was that seizure
was to disturb the normal order of affairs to the minimum;80 and pre-
sumably the continued garnering of profits (with possible resultant
dividend payments) was within this approach.81
This policy has been attacked effectively as an unfair and unreasonable
treatment of the problem. 2 Whatever may have been its value in war,
furthermore, the continuation of this rough-and-ready method would
be entirely unjustified in any peacetime seizure. From the point of
view of the employee who is restrained from striking to protest his
side of the dispute, it must seem a one-sided justice indeed that allows
his antagonist to continue to derive profits from his "forced" labor
while the issue is still undecided. From the public's viewpoint, such a
course of action must in the long-run be disadvantageous. It may
tempt certain employers to prolong government control if they can
reap the profits without the worries. This must ultimately result, first,
in higher taxes to the public, who must pay the cost of government
administration; second, in an impetus to permanent government oper-
ation and possibly also ownership, which, good or bad, should be clearly
recognized as such; and third, in a general discrediting of the mecha-
nism of collective bargaining. As the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
said in a recent decision relating to seizure of a ferry under a special
state statute:
"Rather it would be unjust under the circumstances to pay all
the profits to the ferry company, regardless of whether they would
exceed just compensation. To do so would make the Commissioner,
7 9Witte, Wartime Handling of Labor Disputes, 25 HARv. Bus. REV. 169, 175 (1947).
But see, as to losses, Coal Mines Admin. Reg., Operation of Mines under Govt. Control,
8 FED. REG. 10,712, § 301.17 (b) (1943).
8 OThis is discussed at page 178, under the sub-heading Administration.
81E.g., Exec. Order No. 9727, 11 FED. REG. 5461 (1946) provided for payments of
dividends on the stock and of principal, interest, sinking funds, etc., on the bonds of
seized railroads.82
TwENTIETn CENTURY FUND LABOR CONWfITTEE, STRIKES AND Dk~oCRATC GOVERN-
MENT 27 (1947) ; Gerhart, Strikes and Eminent Domain, 30 J. A-:. Jun. Soc'y 120 (1946).
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contrary to the plain language and intendment of the Act, the agent
of the ferry company, operating the ferries for the benefit of the
ferry company and placing it in the happy position of having all to
gain and nothing to lose by the Commissioner's continuing to oper-
ate the ferries....
"Since the Commissioner has assumed control, the ferries are
not to be returned to the ferry company until it is able and willing
to operate them. If the ferry company could take all the profits,
without having either to raise wages to end the strike, or to run
the risk of a toll reduction, or to assume any other risks of operation,
its willingness to take back its properties might not arrive on
winged feet. There would be little incentive for it to try to settle
its difficulties with its employees. The result would be to require
the employees to work for the profit of the company while they
are nominally the employees of the State.""3
The injustices of turning over profits to private companies are multiplied
out of all reason by causing the government to bear any losses-a new
sort of "heads I win, tails you lose" transaction. 4
3. Compensation for government seizure and operation:
Unlike government seizures during the war, peacetime seizure may
not be based on the war powers of the president85 or a War Labor Disputes
Act. Among various possibilities, peacetime seizures may be predicated
upon an extension of the government's inherent power of eminent
domain.8 6  This assures the company of just compensation and thus
represents a fair and adequate method of handling the problem."
It meets the constitutional requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Under the eminent domain power as used in a labor dispute in
essential industry, the government would take limited interests-only
those necessary to accomplish its objective of keeping the industry
running under circumstances conducive to restoring labor peace through
8 3Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co., 186 Va. 481, 498, 43 S. E. 2d 10, 19 (1947);
Note, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 198 (1948).
84 It is questionable how great a problem this would be, since most utilities show
a relatively constant income, even during depressions. Railroads and other transportation
utilities, some of which have been rather consistently "in the red," are an exception.85 The president's power to take and use property in furtherance of the war effort
was argued in National War Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 144 F. 2d 528
(App. D. C. 1944), cert. dqnied, 323 U. S. 774, 65 Sup. Ct. 134 (1944).
86See Gerhart, Strikes and Eminent Domain, 30 J. A.r. Jun. Soc'Y 116 (1946).
8 TAs to the problem of compensation, Gerhart argues that compensation must be paid
if the owner is deprived of any beneficial use of the property, and that mere govern-
ment possession is sufficient to entitle the owner deprived of beneficial use to such pay-
ment. Ken-Rad Tube & Lamp Corp. v. Badeau, 55 F. Supp. 193, 200 (W. D. Ky.
1944); Teller, Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1017, 1056
(1947). But see Newsletter of the Federation of the Bar, Sixth judicial District, re-
porting the March 21, 1947 meeting of the Federation Committee on Labor Law, as quoted
in note 12 supra.
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free collective bargaining. The interests would be taken by the gov-
erment acting not as a traditional lessee in a condemnation procedure,
but as a sovereign appropriator. The government would have the seize,
in order to accomplish its objectives:
(a) Temporary (indefinite in time) control (management function)"8
with use of assets, including stockholders' capital.
(b) The potential profits accruing because of government operation
during the period of seizure.
Any plan which does not provide government control of profits will
fail to satisfy a primary objective of seizure, since there can be no
free collective bargaining where the company continues to make a
profit out of the labor of its employees who are negotiating with it while
they are in practical effect required by government intervention to
continue working. Since seizure is predicated upon a labor shortage
that is at least in large part effective, the government intervention is
responsible for the creation of any profits instead of the losses caused
by idle plants.8 9 As a practical matter, there is no way of restoring
the profits to the consumers from whom they were derived; there is
therefore no place for them to go except to the state, for in the last
analysis the state most completely represents the consuming public,
which is the source of revenue and in whose behalf the service has been
continued.
Since the government takes only those interests which are necessary
for it to accomplish its objectives, there is no reason for it to take over
the burden of paying the company's operating losses. There is no
reason for carrying over the arbitrary assumption from private law
that government must assume all a lessee's burdens if it asumes a lessee's
benefits, since there is in this case no traditional lessee relationship:
the government takes only such interests as it needs for its purposes and
pays compensation for those interests only. As a practical matter, the
assumption of losses by the government might make it inexpedient to
use seizure in the case of companies that regularly lose money (as
certain transportation companies do). On the other hand, it might tempt
financially embarrassed corporations to provoke labor trouble, in order to
make government seizure and consequent assumption of losses necessary.
It may be added that, to the extent the right to take profits is an
element in determining the amount of "just compensation" to be awarded,
any probability of government assumption of losses would reduce the
compensation paid.
8SThat there is such an interest has become orthodox economic doctrine since the days
of BERLE & MEANs, THna MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119 et seq. (1933).
89Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co., 186 Va. 481, 489, 498, 43 S. E. 2d 10, 15, 19 (1947).
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While determination of the just compensation for these interests
which the government takes in such a case would not be simple, the
general problem is one with which courts are familiar and which they
pass on traditionally. During the war, the Supreme Court enunciated a
rule to ascertain the value of temporary interests condemned by the gov-
ernment. 0 And general criteria to be used in the case of ferry seizures
under a special state seizure statute were worked out by the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals when confronted by an appeal from the State
Highway Commissioner's determination of compensation for the owner
of a struck ferry.91 The court in that case held: (1) the fair rental
value was just compensation for permanent seizure; 92 (2) the fair
rental value was the value which the owner lost-which here would be
drastically reduced because of the fact that the owner could not operate
during a strike effective enough to necessitate seizure-and not the
profit made by the taker;93 (3) profits arising from the commissioner's
operation were not an automatic test for the fair compensation due,
since that rule, applied to an unprofitable operation, would prohibit any
compensation for the owner-an untenable position;94 and (4) profits
above the fair rental value must inure to the state, whose operation
of the facilities had made them possible when the same operation could
not have been carried on at all by the private owner.95
While the use of "fair rental value" is a traditional approach to
compensation in government seizure cases, it must never be forgotten
that it is rental or compensation for the interest taken and for that alone.
There is no simple leasehold here involved, but a taking of limited
interests to accomplish a complex but essential public purpose. Perhaps
9
oUnited States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 65 Sup. Ct. 357 (1945), as
modified by United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 66 Sup. Ct. 596 (1946);
Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Comm'r, 52 F. 2d 372, 379 et seq. (C. C. A. 8th 1931).
OlAnderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co., 186 Va. 481, 43 S. E. 2d 10 (1947).
921d. at 491, 43 S. E. 2d at 16.93
"All the ferry company is entitled to is pay for what was taken at the time it
was taken, not for what the taker made out of it after it was taken. What the Highway
Commissioner made from the use of the property is not what the owner would have made
if the property had not been taken ... " Id. at 491, 43 S. E. 2d at 16.
94Id. at 492, 43 S. E. 2d at 16.
9 5
"The profits that have been made by the Highway Commissioner do not represent
money that has been taken away from the ferry company. It is money that has been
made by the Highway Commissioner by using the power of the State to quicken into
action an idle enterprise. It would have remained idle and without any capacity to earn
for its owners except for the exercise of the State's authority. That authority should not
be used to make money for the owner that the owner could not have made for itself. Y
Id. at 489, 43 S. E. 2d at 15.
"If the application of that method results in profits to the State that the legislature
did not expect to accrue, that is not the fault of the State. These profits result from
the tolls paid by the public for the use of the properties owned by the ferry company
and operated by labor which the Act makes the agents and employees of the State
Highway Department. It is not inequitable for the Commissioner to retain for the
benefit of the public such profits as remain after paying the ferry company just compensation
for the use of its properties. . . Y Id. at 498, 43 S. E. 2d at 19.
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one of the most difficult practical problems facing government officials
under a seizure statute will be to convince the courts that compensation
is not an equivalent of profits, granted to the owners in another form.
It should not be a windfall, the salvation of a company close to in-
solvency, but a payment calculated with the purpose of the taking
constantly before the court. It should be remembered that profits
during the seizure accrue because the government keeps the struck
plant running, and that the company should not benefit because of the
seizure which is made for the benefit of the general public and not of
the company.
It may be that compensation will have to be paid also to company
officials under contract who are displaced during the seizure period.
This will be true, of course, only if they are dismissed because the gov-
ernment takes over their functions without fault on their part. The
degree to which management officials of an "essential industry" are
responsible to the public for the character of the operation of their
companies, including their labor policies, presents a question which
cannot be explored here. 6
An alternative plan for seizure might be premised on the govern-
ment's power to seek a receivership, and under the receivership to
administer struck plants. In place of being paid just compensation,
the company might take its profits but be required to pay a charge,
as it would be in the case of an ordinary equity receivership, for the
expense and inconvenience to the state of government intervention.
The Virginia general seizure statute follows this line of approach, de-
manding 15% of net profits for the government; but a percentage of
gross income or a flat fee based on net worth, or proportional to net
worth, might be substituted. It would seem that if the objectives
of government seizure were to be attained successfully, the fee would
have to be high enough to make it impossible for the company to profit
at the expense of the "forced" labor of its employees and yet it should
not penalize the financially unstable company by imposing too heavy
fees. To do that might defeat the interests of the workers as well as
those of the company.
It may well be that the ideal statute should embody alternative
provisions under which seizure may be accomplished, under different
circumstances, in the government's option.
4. Wages and working conditions during seizure:
Wartime seizure orders usually specified that existing wages and
9 6For proof that such a problem is coming to be recognized, see Abrams v. Allen,
297 N. Y. 52, 74 N. E. 2d 305 (1947).
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working conditions should be continued during seizure;" in the rather
exceptional cases where seizure was caused by the failure of the com-
pany to comply with War Labor Board directives concerning wages or
working conditions, the Board's orders were put into effect immediately
by the seizing agency. 8 The usual policy of continuing existing pro-
visions could be followed in peacetime. Or the government might de-
termine fair wages and put them into effect, just as it could determine
fair compensation for the owners.99
Despite the strong arguments in favor of establishing different ("fair")
wages, the writers are, hesitantly, in favor of continuing existing wages
and working conditions during seizure.00 Where the government puts
into effect its own determined "just" wages, it tends to put pressure on
both sides somewhat equivalent to that of compulsory arbitration. For
the pressure to accept these wages as the final figure in bargaining will
be great, where neither side is free to resort to more extreme measures
(strike or lockout) to gain acceptance of its views. As a practical
matter, it is a fact that once a wage increase has been put into effect,
it is nearly impossible under normally stable economic conditions to
reduce wages again. The logical result is that the persons who de-
termine the just compensation for employees during seizure are setting
a minimum rate above which bargaining will take place, regardless
of the bargaining power of the two parties. Thus the scope of free
collective bargaining, desirable in the interests of self-government in
industry, is diminished rather than enhanced.
By maintaining the same wages and conditions it may be argued
that pressure of a different sort is exerted on the employees. The
O7 1n accordance with WLDA § 4. E.g, Exec. Order No.. 9570, 10 Fr. REG. 7235 (1945)
(Scranton Transportation Co.); Exec. Order No. 9639, 10 FED. REG. 12,592 (1945) (pet-
roleum companies).9 8 E.g., Exec. Order No. 9480, 9 FED. REG. 11,143 (1944) (Twentieth Century Brass
Works, Inc.); Exec. Order No. 9552, 10 FED. REG. 5757 (1945) (Cocker Machine &
Foundry Co.).
It should be noted that War Labor Board directives were not enforceable or review-
able, and that reports made by it to the Director of Economic Stabilization and to the
president because of non-compliance were merely advisory, so that their correctness
could not be reviewed by the courts. National War Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 144 F. 2d 528 (App. D. C. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 774, 65 Sup. Ct. 134
(1944); National War Labor Board v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 145 F. 2d 97 (App. D. C.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 856, 65 Sup. Ct. 857 (1945).9 9 This plan is preferred by Gerhart, Strikes and Enminent Domain, 30 J. Am. JuD.
Soc'Y 116, 120-122 (1946). He argues that there is property in the job, which the gov-
ernment takes, in the same way that there is property in the seized plant; the employee
is entitled to just compensation for the taking of his job (property): thus there is just
compensation for all parties to the seizure. He also adds that as a practical matter,
this proposal will work both ways-it will solve the problem when the company
proposes a reduction in wages in periods of depression.
20 0An exception might reasonably be made in case of disputes caused by health or
safety hazards, where the dangerous effects of certain conditions might be sufficiently
clear to warrant immediate remedial action. See Interim Safety Requirements for Mines
in Govt. Possession, Coal Mines Admin. Order, 11 FED. REG. 6456 (1946).
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answer to that appears to be that some pressure is inevitable, that an
equal pressure is being applied to the company in the form of no profits,
and that if the union is strong enough it can bargain to have wage
arrangements made retroactive to the beginning of the dispute or of
the seizure.
5. Right to strike or quit during seizure:
The current anti-work-stoppage acts have two factors in common.
All of them prohibit strikes (conspiracy or concerted action by the union)
during government arbitration or seizure. And all of them allow in-
dividual workers to quit their jobs at any time. Many of the laws
provide heavy fines for each day the workers strike, with additional
penalties levied against the union.1°1
While a heavy financial penalty imposed on union or worker, or
both, is one very effective method of preventing a strike during seizure,
it is submitted that an equally effective and better method may be
found in that provided in the Virginia statute. Under that law, strikers
lose their employee status; the company is allowed to rehire them only
as new employees without benefit of seniority, pension rights, etc. that
had accrued; and it cannot be compelled to rehire any of such strikers. 2
Under this law the judgment-proof employee cannot escape the con-
sequences of his act, and the union will not be irreparably injured
by the "wildcat" action of any of its members, except as it loses in-
dividual members. And in such industries the union cannot afford
to have such irresponsible members.0 3 Of course, the right of the
employees individually to quit employment cannot be questioned.0 4
It is impossible to discuss this question without considering the prob-
lem of whose employees these workers are during the period of seizure.
This problem appears to have been answered by the Lewis case, that
for the limited purposes here involved they are government employees
and subject to the applicable limits on the right of government employees
to strike. 5 As indicated below, for other purposes the workers may
10 1Or they may make striking contempt of court. In those cases where there is no
provision for seizure during compulsory arbitration, the laws usually provide for com-
parable fines against the companies for lockouts and for withdrawal of the certificate
of convenience and necessity.1 0 2For the right of striking employees to return to their jobs, see National Labor
Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904
(1938).
'O3Slichter argues that employees in essential industry should be accorded special
status, involving special privileges, in return for giving up the right to strike. Slichter,
To .End Strikes in Essential Industries, N. Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1947, § 6, p. 7; SrLzcnTER
THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRTAL RELATIONS 167-9 (1947).
'
0 4National Protective Association v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 321, 63 N. E. 369
(1902). This was clearly recognized in WLDA § 6.
'
0 5 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 67 Sup. Ct. 677 (1947).
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still be considered private employees, for there would, for example,
be nothing gained by assigning them temporary civil service status.'0 6
6. Termination of seizure:
During the war seizure was usually concluded by a simple notice
in the Federal Register stating that it would be terminated at a certain
date and time, and a release was executed by the company in favor
of the government upon withdrawal of the army.' Termination may
not be quite so simple in peacetime.
Seizure should be ended as soon as the two parties notify the govern-
ment'manager that they have reached an agreement (either a final
settlement or a plan for voluntary arbitration) and are capable of
carrying on the service without interruption. Calculation of profits
to which the government is entitled should be a matter of ordinary
corporate accounting in most cases. 08  In a few instances, however, it
might involve complex or cumbersome problems, such as inventories
of work-in-process. 10 9 It would be one of the problems of the govern-
ment manager to determine whether the difficulties of such accounting
would involve an unjustified expense; and, if so, to determine some
approximately accurate substitute method, such as a pro-rated share
of company profits for the year. Just compensation for the owners
would be determined by the method suggested above."10 The government
should not incur any liability for discretionary acts of its manager done
in good faith."'
10 6The regulations of the Solid Fuel Administrator for operation of the coal mines
specifically provide that company officials and workers are not officers or employees
within the meaning of the statutes regarding federal employment, Solid Fuels Admin.
Reg., Operation of Mines under Govt. Control §§ 603.16 (d), 603.23 (e) (1943), 8 FED.
REG. 6655.
10 7A typical termination order read: "Pursuant to Executive Order . . . I hereby
determine that possession and control of - by the United States is no longer necessary
for the successful prosecution of the war, and . . . possession and control by the United
States of - is hereby terminated and relinquished as of 12:01 o'clock a.m. . . . No
further action shall be required to effect the termination of Government control."
(Italics added.) Termination of Possession of Kan. Transport Freight Lines, ODT
Order, 10 FED. REG. 2773 (1945). The Government did, however, provide in the original
seizure regulations that it might require submission of information regarding operations
during seizure in order to ascertain the existence and amount of any claims against it.
so that the seizure order "may be concluded in an orderly manner." Termination of
Possession of Tenn. Consol. Mines, Office of the Secy. of the Interior Order, 10 Fzn. REG.
5531 (1945).
108 1n Federal Mgr. of Motor Carrier Transportation, ODT Order, 9 FED. REG. 10,102
(1944), carriers were ordered to keep their books so that transactions after government
seizure would be separate.
'O9This is less apt to be the case in public service companies, which are of primary
concern in this paper, than in regular manufacturing establishments.
11OThis is discussed at page 171, under the sub-heading Compensation for government
seizure and operation.
"'1Even the Federal Tort Claims Act still exempts the government from liability for
discretionary acts of its employees. 60 STAT. 845 (1946), 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (Supp. 1948).
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Administration
Wartime seizures were primarily formalities:
"Until further order, you are hereby directed to continue oper-
ations in the usual and ordinary manner and course of business,
as a going enterprise, . . .as fully as if possession and control had
not been .. . assumed by the United States, subject, however, to
... said Executive order, and to all general and special orders....
Title to the properties and other assets of which possession has
been taken remains in the owners thereof. Possession by the United
States is not exclusive and the United States asserts . . .only such
control over the properties in its limited possession as may be
necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Executive order.""'
It is the writers' belief, as indicated, that this practice should not be
continued in future seizures where matters of policy are concerned. The
manner in which government control should be exercised has been dis-
cussed above. In day-to-day administration, however, the interest of
the government was, and may rightly be, recognized as something less
than total legal ownership. It may in fact be viewed as something akin
to a management interest, which, however, for its limited purposes
cannot be altered by the disapproval of the stockholders. This will
give a certain dual character to the seizure, but such a situation, where
different legal attributes are recognized for different purposes, is not
unique in the law;. 3 and the writers believe that ultimately it will
produce less confusion and result in better service than would com-
plete government ownership. In the problems discussed below, the
dual characteristics of seizure will be apparent. They should be con-
sidered in advance by government administrators so that the resulting
questions may be anticipated.
1. Continuation of union activity:
Seizure orders during the war allowed the continuation of "concerted
activity" on the part of employees so long as it did not interfere with
war production."' This policy should be continued, subject to the
necessary prohibition on strikes or slowdowns. Although the workers
are government employees during the seizure so far as the right to
strike is concerned, they should not lose their status as private employees
where the right to organize and join unions is in question. Government
seizure should not be perverted so as to become a means of "union
busting," even temporarily.
ll 2Federal Mgr. of Govt. Controlled Railroads, ODT Order, 11 FED. REG. 5512 (1946).
113Marriage, for example, involves both contract and status; under civil service gov-
ernment employees continued to accrue seniority and other rights while they were on
active duty in the armed services.
114 See note 22 supra.
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2. Continuation of private benefit systems:
Benefits enjoyed by private employees, such as a social security,
should be continued, as they were during wartime seizure. 1 5 It would
be administratively impossible, as well as patently absurd, to shift all
the workers of a seized plant temporarily onto a government pension
plan (which is not interchangeable with social security and does not
cover the same scope as the private systems, such as unemployment
insurance) and then to return them to private plans.
3. Effect on contracts:
Government seizure should not affect the status of existing contracts,
or obligations under them. In actual fact, the company for this purpose
remains the real party to the contracts as much as it would in the case
of a change of management by the board of directors, the difference
being that in this case the change is imposed by the sovereign instead
of by the representatives of the private owners. Similarly, contracts
made by the government manager on behalf of the company during
seizure should be binding upon the company, for the contract period,
subject to the usual remedies of reformation or rescission. In neither
case should the government incur any liability on the contracts,"0
since it has, for administrative purposes, merely an interest equivalent
to that of management.
Among related problems which might be considered in planning
seizure policy are the responsibilities of a government manager who
discovers illegal contracts or contracts unnecessarily disadvantageous
to a public utility. Is there a duty on him to disavow or to seek re-
formation or rescission; which remedy should he seek, and under
what circumstances? What are his responsibilities to report such facts
to a public service commission, taxing agency, or other branch of gov-
ernment which might have an interest therein?
4. Tort liabili.ty:
Tort liability for acts of employees during seizure should be the liabil-
ity of the company in the same sense that contract liabilities are those of
the company, and for the same reasons. In actual fact, whenever the com-
pany is held respondeat superior for the torts of an employee, the govern-
ment will be affected, because a judgment against the company will be
reflected in the profits for the period, to which the government is
entitled.
11 5See notes 23 and 24 supra.
11Coal Mines Admin. Reg., Operation of Coal Mines under Govt. Control, 8 FED. REG.
10,712 (1943) specifically provided that no operating manager had authority to bind or
impose' any liability on the United States in the absence of specific direction.
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5. Taxes and public regulation:
In view of the dual character of seizure, the company should, as was
provided during the war,"" be subject to all federal, state and local
taxes, and to all government regulatory provisions. The arguments
applying to contract liability apply here also.
The profits to which the government is entitled under eminent domain
should be those which would accrue to the company if it were operating
independently at that time, which would of course be subject to taxes.
In practice, the particular seizing government would gather through
taxes most of what it would lose from potential profits; so there would
be no difference in overall revenue to that government. Since inter-
governmental immunity from taxation is now rather an obsolescent
concept," 8 little besides administrative confusion would result if the
seizing government should refrain from taxing the company it seized;
it would not be exempt from taxation by other governments merely
because the seizing government did not levy a tax.
Somewhat similar considerations apply to the question of regulation.
As a matter of public policy it would be thoroughly impolitic to require
an industry to obey certain regulations as long as it was in private
hands, but to relax the requirements for the short period of govern-
ment seizure, which, as indicated, is for administrative purposes little
more than mere possession. Then to again enforce against the industry
the standards by which government management did not abide would
make a farce of the whole regulatory system. The validity of any
regulations subject to such vagaries would be open to question by both
the industry and the public.
6. Suits by or against seized companies:
A problem that should be considered is the wisdom of requiring or
permitting postponement of suits to be brought by or against the
company during seizure," 9 with any necessary provision for tolling the
Statute of Limitations. Constitutional issues might be raised if such
a statute was interpreted to limit the traditional jurisdiction of equity
courts over suits involving questions of irreparable damage.'20 In
general, however, assuming that seizure would be a rare and short-
"17 See note 47 supra.
118New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 66 Sup. Ct. 310 (1946); Graves v. New
York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595 (1939).
119 Specific provisions allowing suits were made in a few cases during the war: Solid
Fuels Admin. Reg., Operation of Mines under Govt. Control § 603.24 (b), 8 FED. REG.
6655 (1943); Federal Mgr. of Motor Carrier Transportation, ODT Order, 9 FED. REG.
10,102 (1944); Federal Mgr. of Govt. Controlled Railroads, ODT Order, 11 FED. REG.
5512 (1946).
120 Callanan v. Judd, 23 Wis. 343 (1868).
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lived incident, postponement might not entail serious hardships on the
parties involved.
War seizure orders often prohibited attachment, by mesne process
or otherwise, without prior government consent.' 21 The necessity for
continuing this provision should be determined and appropriate regu-
lations prepared in anticipation of such a contingency.
7. Bankruptcy proceedings:
During the war the coal mines by executive order remained subject
to the Bankruptcy Law,'2 2 but in most cases, where any provision was
made, prior consent of the government manager was required for such
proceedings. 23 Whether, or under what circumstances, this policy should
be continued in the case of peacetime seizures, is another problem to
be considered in advance. Seizure statutes should be drawn so that they
will not be used as a method of staving off insolvency or bankruptcy
proceedings, rather than as a last resort in case of genuine labor disputes.
Conclusions
When a government determines that seizure is necessitated by work
stoppage in any industry essential to the public health or safety, it
must work out a plan that to some degree gives a dual legal character
to the seizure and to the parties concerned. As to fundamental policy,
the seizure should be directed to encourage free collective bargaining;
it should be real, not merely formal, with fair compensation in lieu
of profits to the company owners, while existing wages are continued
for the employees, who are forbidden to strike. As to daily adminis-
tration, the realities of temporary government seizure should be faced,
if necessary at the expense of theory, by operating the plant for the
most part under standards applicable to the private management from
which it has been temporarily taken and to which it will again be
returned.
'
2
'Exec. Order No. 9658, 10 FED. REG. 14,351 (1945) (Capital Transit Col.); Exec.
Order No. 9661, 10 FED. RaG. 14,591 (1945) (Great Lakes Towing Co.). But see Federal
Mgr. of Govt. Controlled Railroads, ODT Order, 11 FED RaG. 5512 (1946) (railroads
remain subject to attachment).
122 Warner Coal Co. v. Costanzo Transportation Co., 144 F. 2d 589, 593-94 (C. C. A.
4th 1944).
123E.g., Federal Mgr. of Govt. Controlled Railroads, ODT Order, 11 FED. REG. 5512
(1946).
1948]
